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ISLAMIC NATURAL LAW THEORIES, by Anver M. Emon'
HASSAN AHMAD
ANVER M. EMON SURVEYS classical juridical opinions concerning the role of
reason in Islamic law and theology. He delineates how pre-modern Muslim
jurists utilized nature as the link between divine will and human reason in fusing
fact and value.
'The first chapter introduces natural law and its historical place in the
Islamic ethos. Emon elucidates three reasons for the usefulness of natural law,
namely its malleability into law and theology; its distinctness from rigid legal
classifications that place scholars into one school of thought or another; and
its multi-dimensional capability of relating to scholars of varying intellectual
inclinations. He explains Islamic natural laws contribution to the understanding
of reason within Shari'a and presents contemporary debates concerning the issue.
The chapter concludes with an overview of the Islamic natural law theories that
comprise the remainder of the book, termed Hard and Soft Natural Law, the
primary difference being that in the former, the natural world is an immutable
force created by God for the benefit of humanity, whereas in the latter, nature is
mutable by the grace of God (fadl). The soft naturalists' critique of Hard Natural
Law, termed the Voluntarist critique, centres upon God's omnipotence and
aversion to placing value judgments of good or evil upon human beings based on
their reasoned judgments.
Chapter two provides a synopsis of Hard Natural Law and the jurists who
espoused its tenets. Emon focuses on three individuals and their'contributions.
First, he discusses Abu Bakr al-Jassas's espousal of the presumption of permissibility
concerning all matters unmentioned in sacred texts. Al-Jassas posited that God
created the cosmos for the benefit of humanity, and thus reasoned determinations
on matters unstated by divine revelation are permissible and to be encouraged.
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Next, Emon discusses Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbar's Hard Natural Law theory, which
utilized concepts such as sustenance (rizq), obligation (taklifi, divine assistance
(lu], and justice (al-ta'dil wa'l-tajwir). Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbar theorized that "God
provides human beings with sustenance, which is an empirically verifiable good
that sustains human life.... [S]ince [sustenance] is bestowed by God, it offers a
basis for fusing fact and value in nature."2 Lastly, the author discusses the natural
law epistemology of Abu al-Husayn al-Basri, who echoed al-Jassas's theory of the
presumption of permissibility but claimed. that acts are functions of the "onto-
logical presumption about nature and reason... Where there is no evidence of evil
or corruption in an act, the act is deemed to be good on naturalistic grounds."3
Chapter three presents the Voluntarist critique of Hard Natural Law,
which focuses on the fallibility of human reason and the primacy of divine will.
Voluntarists criticized the hard naturalist notion that reason can reflect divine
intent, subsequently limiting God's omnipotence. Emon surveys the various
views espoused by eminent jurists including al-Baqallani, ibn Hazm, al-Ghazali,
and ibn 'Aqil on the role and ability of human knowledge to conceive truth. The
author then discusses determinations made by reason and the inherent qualities
of good (husn) and bad (qubh) in such human determinations. The chapter ends
by explaining the Voluntarist critique of hard naturalists in fusing fact and value.
While the latter presumed permissibility in matters not mentioned by divine
texts, the former argued for a state of suspended judgment in such instances
(tawaqqufi, thus limiting the role of reason.
Chapter four outlines the precepts of Soft Natural Law, whose adherents
relied more heavily on divine texts that emphasize analogical deduction in
their hermeneutics to extend the law. They viewed nature as contingent upon
a divine change in mind and thus not an independent source of human reason,
despite the fact that they accounted for societal benefit (maslaha) in their juristic
consideration. The author proceeds through this chapter by outlining theories
from the most prominent soft naturalists, namely al-Ghazali, al-Raii, al-Tufi,
and al-Shatibi.
The conclusion highlights two ironies from the preceding chapters-first,
that despite varying theological positions, jurists came to similar conclusions in
fusing fact and value in nature and second, that the soft naturalist commitment
to reasoned deliberation, used historically as an agent of limitation in
legal interpretation, has been utilized by modern reformers as a method of
expanding Shari'a.
2. Ibid at 52.
3. Ibid at 82.
